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Musings of a Serial Entrepreneur—
Reconciling Theory with Practice
Joseph E. Levangie

T

o reminisce about my entrepreneurial career with
appropriate self-importance, I might note that I have
helped create companies and jobs. This contributes in a
small way to economic growth. Economic growth is, however,
an often illusive concept to characterize. Job growth is an
essential component of a dynamic, innovative process. In the
late 1970s jobs growth research suggested that the vast majority of new jobs are created by small business formation. Such
empirical research is difficult to support with theoretical constructs. Classic macroeconomics analysis discounts size-offirm as irrelevant. Entrepreneurial contribution is therefore
difficult to assess.
If we cannot divine satisfaction from arcane macroeconomic treatises (e.g., the “creative destruction theory” of
shifting market structure crafted in the 1930s by Joseph
Schumpeter), perhaps we can understand, from a bottom-up
perspective, how these storied champions of small business
formation really think and operate: the entrepreneurs.
If the so-called “science” of economics seems difficult to
nail down, so too are the fundamentals and psychology of
the venturing process. The intrinsic entrepreneurial success
it occasionally spawns, from this practitioner’s vantage
point, represents a true mélange of conflicting views, often
mysterious in its very nature. Accordingly, I choose to study
this curious entrepreneurship process as a set of mysteries!

The Seven Mysteries of Venturing

Let me address the following seven entrepreneurial mysteries:
1. Are entrepreneurs made or born?
2. Does new venturing represent high risk or “measured” risk?
3. Is the business plan a selling document or an integrated and detailed guide?
4. Should entrepreneurs be fast-moving and act with
intuition or employ MBA-like analytical tools?
5. Should emerging companies stay clear of large
entrenched companies or try to work with them?
6. Should entrepreneurs focus on personal equity
control of their company or relinquish control in
exchange for adequate resources?

7. Is the ultimate raise-up of seed and growth capital
a logical fall-out of the entrepreneurship process or
a serendipitous miracle?
I will apply the lessons of my own successes and failures of the last three decades to interpret these dilemmas.

Mystery #1—Born Entrepreneurs

Are entrepreneurs made or born?
Entrepreneurship can involve mind-numbing risk taking and produce brain chemical rushes that defy description. The very nature of analyzing entrepreneurs can be
like trying to interpret the lifestyles of fuzzy, crawly alien
life. An integrating principle is often lacking. The “venturing addiction” can also produce anecdotal tales of entrepreneurs snatching defeat from the jaws of victory:
• I had an enraged entrepreneur throw an ash-filled
trash can at me (he missed) in London when he stubbornly refused to share, with other venture team
members, a meeting with institutional investors. I
persisted. The “team” prevailed. We executed a successful London IPO.
• I was sued by an entrepreneur advisee who was emotionally dismayed that I would not endorse the use of
either his wife’s name or image on a box of
biodegradable diapers.
• I was chastised by a “born again” Christian entrepreneur who challenged my very morality for not
endorsing a (“born-again” logo) venture for which he
intellectually or psychologically could not even craft
a sensible business plan . The lack of this critical document caused all his “born again” investors to walk.
Born or made? My own venturing proclivity is best
described as an acquired quirk, not a genetic or glamorous
gift. I have met just a few life-long, inveterate entrepreneurs. Almost idiot savants, they have been gifted lateral
thinkers in strategic thinking, market interpretation, product development, financial “engineering,” and the like,
while often lacking practical social skills such as tact, flexibility, open communications, team building, and operations savvy. But they’re certainly not idiots. I took the more
traditional route, acquiring academic and business credentials to establish both an economic safe haven and a
knowledge base so I could eventually figure out what I
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wanted to be when I grew up. My entrepreneurial learning
process is unending, and my own “idiot” issue remains
unresolved.
Given that we’re trying to reconcile certain theories
about entrepreneurship with the practical aspects of competing in the deal-making trenches, the notion of who is
attracted to small growth businesses—with what motivation, and what characteristics, and what external environmental influences—is an excellent trigger point to understanding what skill sets become manifest in the entrepreneurial world.
Perhaps a little historic context of regional venture
activity would help. The New England region has long
been a hot bed for entrepreneurs. As Sobel (1974) notes,
the region can boast the early 19th-century factory systems
guru Francis Cabot Lowell. His namesake city on the
Merrimac River once had 11 robust textile mills, using the
Jacquard loom invented in 1801. The use of punched cards
to control the new technology set the stage for later application to the computer industry. Ultimately over the span
of two centuries, all the textile mills were recycled to commercial high tech. Our region has transformed from
dependence on textiles to aerospace/defense, to minicomputers, to biotech, to artificial intelligence, to genomics.
Pumped with ideas from MIT, Harvard and a hundred
other colleges and universities, our regional economy
thrives on brainpower (and precious few state-sponsored
economic incentives!).
Entrepreneurs provide the requisite lubricant. Royal
Little ignored his uncle (Arthur D. Little), dropped out of
Harvard with his own entrepreneurial notion on textile
company roll-ups, and learned entrepreneurial finance
(find high margin companies with tax losses and modest
debt and low stock price; leverage the balance sheet to
borrow the bulk of purchase price; sell off nonperforming
assets; and repay loan). Textron, one of the region’s
biggest employers, was thus born of a guiding consolidation principle and entrepreneurial devotion to execution
of plan.
By the late 1960s, entrepreneurship in New England
was vibrant, but relatively much simpler than today.
General Georges Doriot was the reigning VC guru. A
Harvard Business School professor, he put his American
Research & Development (AR&D) firm in the VC Hall of
Fame for parlaying a $70,000 investment in Digital
Equipment into almost $500 million in less than a decade.
(Of course, the B-School case study revealed in the appendix that AR&D had a negative 9 percent return on the
remainder of its portfolio.) The net PR effect to young,
aspiring entrepreneurs like myself was addictively alluring. Building exciting new companies that create impor-

tant customer-satisfying product offerings was a possible
career choice. I caught the venture bug, big time, and
wanted someday to be an entrepreneur.
The high profile academic who then (and now is chairman of the MIT Entrepreneurship Center) analyzed venture dynamics was Ed Roberts at MIT’s Sloan School. He
penned a classic Harvard Business Review article (Roberts,
circa 1965) on venture spin-offs, showing how hi-tech
firms like Raytheon, Avco, Itek, and others created hundreds of start-ups along Route 128. He ventured across the
Charles River to visit our HBS class (the Management of
New Enterprises—MNE) and interacted with us snotty Bschoolers. Perhaps given that his own father was an owner
of a retail oil business in Chelsea, Massachusetts, a major
premise of Roberts’ research was an “environmental” profile of successful entrepreneurs, wherein he portrayed the
probability of success to correlate with one coming from a
“small business owner” family. Since my auto mechanic
dad was only an employee, I appeared to be entrepreneurially-challenged coming out of the box. Professor
Roberts took my rantings well, noting that my persistence
(read “obnoxiousness”) and analytical comments, peppered with objections to his research structure, significant
sample size, and loose correlation fits more than offset my
presumed environmental shortcomings for small business.
I wrote my second-year HBS paper on entrepreneurial
pursuits in oceanography. (I have yet to dip my big toe
into that marketplace!)
Counterbalancing the traditional business research
approach to entrepreneurship has been the provocative
theories of the psychoanalytical thinkers. Abraham Zaleznik
(circa 1965) and Harry Levinson (1970) attempted to analyze the internal wiring of managers and entrepreneurs.
Zaleznik is a neo-Freudian who smokes big Churchills
and has a symbolic leather couch in his office. As students, we watched psycho-drama movies in his class (e.g.,
The Caine Mutiny and Twelve Angry Men). We read Freud
and learned about the meaning of Dora’s dreams.
Zaleznik focused on how individuals mobilize and use
power derived from position, competence, and personality. Assumed harmony between position and competence
he viewed as naïve, because entrepreneurial position controls the flow of rewards. Disharmonies between an entrepreneur’s designated authority and his actual competence can engender psychological conflicts with his venture team.
Levinson points to venturing decision-making evolving
out of issues of fear and concern for obsolescence. He
analyses the impulsive motives, manipulation, and control
and disillusionment of the CEO (entrepreneur).
Manfred Kets de Vries (1985), an HBS classmate, joined
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the psychoanalytic camp in the 1970s. He views typical
good entrepreneurs as
• achievement-oriented;
• taking responsibility for decisions;
• disliking repetitive routine work;
• having high levels of energy, perseverance, and
imagination;
• willing to take calculated risks; and
• gifted in instilling contagious enthusiasm.
He also addresses the “dark side” of entrepreneurship.
The distinctive attributes of entrepreneurs seem to produce derived negatives in terms of less glamorous personality quirks:
• generating action for action’s sake; thoughtless decision-making;
• difficulty taking direction or advice from board of
directors;
• personality idiosyncrasies—“misfit” behavior;
• need for total control;
• suspicious, almost paranoid, tendencies—perhaps
derived from inner voices of inferiority;
• need for applause;
• hyperactivity; and
• feelings of suffocation.
Where do I come down on the “good” entrepreneur? Table
1 lists my desired attributes for myself, for my partner(s), or
for my mentee (s). I undoubtedly overanalyze entrepreneurs,
but I can only pursue two to three deals a year.
A word of caution. Don’t overly glamorize the entrepreneur. We did it with the American cowboy. Mostly, the
American cowboy was an illiterate, dusty grunt. The
entrepreneur is generally quite literate and often cleaner.

Table 1
The Good Entrepreneur
1. Drive and energy
2. Long-term commitment
3. Self-confident
4. Experienced and successful
5. Hungry
6. Persistent problem solver
7. Plans and sets goals
8. Intelligent risk taker
9. Learns from mistakes
10. Accepts criticism
11. Is Creative, takes initiative, makes things happen
12. Good at using available resources
13. Desires to win
14. Integrity
15. Superman (woman)

Just as the recognition, applause, and euphoria of
receiving a fancy parchment diploma from a prestigious
university only shrouds the years of tedious, occasionally
hopeless, toil preceding the glamour of the academic milestone, so too is the notoriety attached to a successful entrepreneurial effort. It’s real hard work. Only less difficult
than such impossible challenges as finding a cure for the
common cold, giving birth to a baby, or being a member of
Red Sox Nation. It’s 2 percent inspiration and 98 percent
perspiration. The former is extolled. The latter soon evaporates from memory.
The successful entrepreneur can and should be viewed
favorably. MIT’s Edward Schou noted, “Champions of new
invention display persistence and courage of heroic quality.”

Mystery #2—Venturing Risk

Does new venturing represent high risk or “measured risk?”
Like many of the best entrepreneurs I have known, I
firmly adhere to the adage “It is far better to be lucky than
smart, any time, every time!” We certainly acknowledge
the rigors of the Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest law of
the jungle. But if you bump into a free lunch, enjoy the free
lunch! As a 23-year-old, fresh out of B-School, I was
assigned to take an analytical look at a modular housing
venture. Fortuitously, Business Week had that very week
published a 46-page cover story on the housing industry
that allowed me to quickly assemble a 60-page presentation and champion the opportunity, ultimately letting me
secure corporate backing in just seven weeks. How good is
that kind of good luck?
Why look for good luck? Because being an entrepreneur
in a dynamic, competitive market environment is so difficult. So many variables are in play. Some (independent)
variables, you may be able to control. Most (dependent)
variables, you hope you can influence your way. Like
USAF test pilots or barnstorming daredevils, entrepreneurs want to measure, control, and minimize risk while
getting the job done—successful small business growth.
Churchill and Lewis (1983) provide a framework for the
five stages of small business growth:
1. Existence
2. Survival
3. Success
4. Take-off
5. Resource maturity
Uncertainty is highest in the early stages. If lucky and if
the entrepreneur manages risk well, risk should diminish
across stages. But the nature of the numbers problem persists:
• 1 of 19 new products will succeed.
• Less than 10 percent of all new industrial products
will return a profit.
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• As much as 50 percent of present revenues in most
major industrial companies are accounted for by
products not in existence five years ago.
The first 98 percent of product development is relatively
easy. The last 2 percent is very hard. So imagine how risky
the marketplace is for a raw start-up with no long-term
customer base and no infrastructure! Short-term venture
sales are, therefore, critical. Revenues cover a variety of
venture sins. Cash flow is helped. Validation of the venture
begins.
And the entrepreneur may have no resources! Arthur
Rock (1987), an experienced venture capitalist, reports his
experience. Rock looks at more than 300 business plan proposals a year. At the end of the year, he has invested in only
one or two companies. Entrepreneurs can spend more than
half their time during stage one (existence) looking for
seed capital. And the odds are that they will come up dry.
What due diligence is required to vet the entrepreneur?
What questions do I ask myself, my partners, my advisers? Table 2 lists my typical sequence.
If—that’s a big “IF”—suitable answers are provided, risk
can be assessed and managed. And IF I don’t lie to myself
(the far too prevalent “self-deception”), and IF my partners
or venture incubators don’t lie to me. Due diligence really
means finding the right answer to these questions.

Table 2
Ten Questions to Ask a Small Business
1. Is the company in an area of emerging technology?
2. Is there a market for the technology or product?
3. Why didn’t an established company decide to
exploit and market the product?
4. Is there a natural product line or follow-on
technology?
5. Does management have corporate experience?
6. What are management’s goals?
7. Does management have a 10-year objective and
5-year plan?
8. Does management understand:
•Research & Development?
•Product Development?
•Manufacturing?
•Finance?
•Accounting?
•Legal?
•Marketing & Sales?
•Other?
9. Does management understand the nature and use
of money?
10. Does management have a competent, recognized
leader and decisionmaker?

Table 3
The Business Plan
1. Executive Summary
2. Description of Business & Industry
3. Features & Advantages of Products or Services
- Descriptions, Proprietary Position, Potential
4. Market Analysis
- Customers - Market Size and Trends
- Competition
- Estimated Market Share and Sales
5. Marketing Plan
- Marketing plan - Pricing
- Sales Tactics - Service and Warranty Policies
- Advertising, Public Relations, and Promotion
6. Product Development Plan
- Development Status and Tasks
- Difficulties and Risk - Costs
7. Operations Plan
- Geographic Location - Facilities & Improvements
- Strategy and Plans - Labor Force
8. Management Team
- Organization - Key Management Personnel
- Management Compensation & Ownership
- Board of Directors
- Management Assistance and Training Needs
- Supporting Professional Services
- Public Accounting Firm - Legal Counsel
9. Overall Schedule
- Incorporate Venture
- Completion of Product Development
- Sales Representation
- Dates of Displays at Trade Shows
- Build-up of Inventory - Start of Operation
- Receipt of First Orders - First Sales and Deliveries
- Payment of First AIR (Cash “in”)
Also:
- Number of Management Personnel
- Number of Operations Personnel
- Additions to Plant or Equipment
10. Critical Risks and Problems
- Price Cutting - Bad Inventory Trends
- Overruns in Product Development
- Overruns in Operating Costs
- Low Orders - Schedule Delays
- Long Lead Times in Procurement
- Credit Line - New Equity
- Lack of Availability of Trained Labor
11. The Financial Plan
- Income Statement - Balance Sheet
- Cash Flow - Key Ratios - Assumptions
12. Proposed Company Offering
- Desired Financing - Capitalization - Use of Funds
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Truth be told, no new venture at outset has a probability of success much above 3 to 5 percent. Why? If you take
the inherent uncertainty of each of the 6 to 10 functional
areas (e.g., finance, R&D, product development, sales, production, distribution, etc.), and lay out the sequence of a
simple decision tree, you generate hundreds of milestones
(events and decision points) that must be resolved in
stages to reduce the band of uncertainty. Intelligent execution of the daily plan is critical. Two friends/colleagues—
Baty (1974, 1990) and Brown (1980)—address execution.
God is in the details. Incremental progress against agreedupon milestones reduces risk. A successful journey
through the venture minefield results in the eventual
reduction of risk.
The entrepreneur, however intuitive, must remember to
show constant vigilance regarding those pesky land
mines. Managing that risk is something I highly endorse.
Perhaps the entrepreneur should consider the Serenity
Prayer: God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the
wisdom to know the difference.

Mystery #3–
Role of the Business plan

Is the Business plan a selling document or an integrated and
detailed guide?
Many of us, or our kids, invest considerable time and
energy playing fantasy baseball or fantasy football. It’s fun
but not real. So, too, goes the game of fantasy business
plan. The only certainty with a really comprehensive business plan is that what really eventuates will be substantially different from the scenarios presented in the plan’s
glossy pages. As the wag noted, “Forecasting is always
difficult, particularly when it’s about the future!”
The business plan is an integrated document that
embodies narrative and numbers. Long-winded, incoherent, poorly-written plans are common. Clear, well-written,
and concise plans that insightfully crystallize the crux of
the business concept are quite rare. My personal business
plan outline is listed in Table 3. One customizes the content appropriate to the company’s business.
Business plans must be
• concise,
• complete,
• consistent,
• powerful,
• easy-to-understand, and
• obvious as to how the application of funds reduce
venture risk.
My personal prejudice toward business plans is built
upon 35 years of being in their midst. Familiarity breeds

contempt. I would estimate that I’ve personally written 650
to 700 plans and reviewed, in depth, 2,200 to 2,500. I have
seen all kinds of attempts to communicate (or obfuscate in
the case of a bunch of dot.coms). As with most entrepreneur-investors, I’ve really been there; don’t try to BS a BS-er!
Theory v. Practice. White and Graham (1978) provide a
model for spotting technological winners. They identify 4
“merits”:
1. Inventiveness
2. Embodiment (e.g., miniaturization)
3. Operational
4. Market
These merit assessments lead to a sense of technological
potency and business advantage, which may then translate
into innovative success. I have found this theory helpful as
a checklist to dissecting the plan. My ultimate test is taking that great Internet-induced buzzword—”business
model”—and applying common sense:
• Perform extensive sensitivity analysis on the
spreadsheet projections;
• Test the assumptions for consistency, accuracy,
and completeness;
• Ask the really important questions:
- Who is the customer and what does he
or she want?
- What value is provided?
- What is the competition?
- How does the company actually
make money?
Business Models; Case Examples. Magretta (2002) cites
two examples of business models. In 1892, American
Express introduced the travelers’ check. The advantage?
Customers paid for the checks up front. It worked on float!
Great concept. Sound premise. In contrast, Disney opened
European amusement parks with a glaring error in one
assumption on restaurant utilization. Americans eat in
park restaurants all day long. Europeans have precise, set
eating schedules. Disney lost millions before fine-tuning
an acceptable solution. Understand what makes the business model really work.
Opportunity for Change in Direction. I use the business
plan more as a validation and communication device,
than as a management control tool. The plan can help
change strategic direction. On two major deals, I actually
convinced the venture team to change the end market:
1. Color-matching case example. Instead of the dental
market (enamel color matching) where dentists are
hard to access and nearly impossible to sell, we
switched over to the retail paint market where
40,000 retail paint dealers could be accessed
through 40 paint manufacturers.
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2. DC to AC Electric conversion case example. Instead of
attacking the residential solar electric market and
competing with large utilities, we convinced the
team to become an uninterruptible power source
(UPS) supplier for the then-emerging personal computer market. Having the right business concept
resulted in billions of dollars of created market value.
Depth of Analysis. Clopton’s law states: “For every
credibility gap, there is a gullibility fill.” With business
plans, you risk sudden death using this premise. Assume
all facts will be checked and assumptions questioned by
investors. Practical suggestions include looking at
• Customer purchase orders (POs) and letters of intent
(LOIs)
• Bill of materials authenticated by vendors
• Banking facilities showing working capital availability
• Useful comparative ratio information from recognized
sources:
- Dun & Bradstreet
- Standard & Poors Corporation
- Robert Morris Associates
- Value Line
- Various trade associations
On the color-matching “Greenfield” IPO placement on
the London Stock Exchange, my spreadsheet was actually
audited cell-by-cell by a then-Big 7 firm. I did everything
but put my first-born male in escrow! Assumptions were
cross correlated to the aforementioned documents (POs,
LOIs). By doing it “right” and completely, we successfully
raised $2.8 million in a precedent-setting deal.
Basis of Due Diligence. The business plan allows
potential investors to initiate due diligence. As an entrepreneur, you want this to happen well and efficiently in
order to attract the desired investment.
Linde and Prasad (2000) wrote the MIT
Entrepreneurship Center study on Angel Investors. While
some angels act intuitively, some conduct detailed due
diligence. They
• Read through the business plan.
• Speak extensively with the entrepreneur and the management team.
• Check the references and background of the team.
• Phone current and prospective customers.
• Discuss and introduce the company to prospective
customers and strategic partners to gain a better
understanding of market interest.
• Ask technology experts to evaluate the technology.
• Discuss the deal with targeted industry business associates.
• Understand product-specific market issues by talking
with industry consultants and investment bankers.

• Ask other angel investors or venture capitalists familiar with the industry to look at the deal.
A good business plan sets you on the right track.

Mystery #4—Intuition v. Analysis

Should entrepreneurs be fast-moving and act with intuition or
employ MBA-like analytical tools?
In a sense, this mystery in some circumstances is almost a
nonissue. With truly experienced, competent entrepreneurs,
their extensive knowledge base, intellect, and personal
insight from past successes and failures imbue them with an
analytical sixth sense that seems hard-wired into their DNA.
Perceptions of Analysis. Sixth-sense intuition may
seem nonanalytical to some casual observers. Many
investors, in fact, are critical of stubborn entrepreneurs
who might deem requests for supporting management
analysis (reports, forecasts, budgets, schedules, ratio
analysis) to be interfering and a “useless crutch.” Their
board of directors and investors (many with MBAs) may
well view such requested analytical oversight as “management religion” that needs appropriate devotion.
I have mediated this debate for years. The flip side
extreme, of course, was our MIT ScD CEO who, having
sold just his first three black boxes (UPS), wrote his own
customized inventory control system that could have
helped to run all of General Motors! It was overkill! We
substituted a $30 software package.
Three important points to the analytically-reluctant
entrepreneur
1. The board of directors and investors are really your
“customers.” If they want an analytical measure of
XYZ, they probably should get it. This marketing
approach eliminates a potential negative.
2. Creative use of analytical tools can create valuable
respect and trust. For example, Admiral Hyman
Rickover, father of the U.S. Nuclear Submarine
program, gained unprecedented independence
from his DoD bosses by adopting Program
Evaluation and Reporting Technique (PERT) controls for the management of the program. This preemptive approach creates a positive.
3. An ability to apply concepts like game theory (winwin, win-lose, lose-lose) helps in all phases of
growing a company. Win-win outcomes create a
bigger pie from which all players can share.
Need for Better Analysis. Sometimes, beyond issues of
perception, the entrepreneur actually needs the help of
MBA-like tools. Consider two examples:
1. Defensive: Investors, bankers, and auditors tend to
be analytical. Armed with their assessments, they
can kill the entrepreneur’s pet project as too risky.
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Hodder and Riggs (1985) report that under many
circumstances, the traditional risk assessments
overstate risk:
• Improper treatment of inflation effects
• Excessive downward ROI (DCF) adjustments
for risk, even when risk actually decreases in
later stages of the project
• Failure to acknowledge how management can
proactively influence the reduction of risk
2. Offensive: In one of our young public companies,
we closed on an $11.5 million secondary offering
only because we could schedule an M&A transaction in 75 days rather than the expected 120 days.
The secret? We used PERT to fast-track the closing
of the transaction. Without this analytical tool,
there would be no deal. The market capitalization
increased 150 percent!

Table 4
Warning Signals
• Financials and ratios ignored: Margin, market, debt,
capital, people
• Excuses: Lame and repetitive
• Inadequate control and information systems
• Projects delayed, over cost, behind on milestones
• Morale suddenly low
Consequences. Despite good intentions, ventures can
turn sour. Table 4 lists warning signs that repeat themselves all too often. Table 5 lists internal problems.
Entrepreneurs, self-styled as invincible, often ignore these
warnings. Compliant BODs become unwitting enablers.
Disaster looms.
Hamm (2002) addresses the classic shortcoming of
entrepreneurs’ ability to scale up operations.
Entrepreneurs who can scale must take deliberate steps to
confront their shortcomings and become the leaders their
organizations need them to be. What barriers do many
entrepreneurs subconsciously introduce to thwart their
own efforts? Consider these negatives:
• Undue loyalty to comrades.
• Task orientation rather than goal-orientation.
• Single-mindedness and insensitivity to others.
• Diffidently working in isolation.
The consequences to the entrepreneur of not adapting
to the needs of his or her growing company can be dire.
Consider
• I have led the firing of five CEOs of public companies
we have founded or cofounded.
• I have been fired three times.
• I have fired myself twice.

Table 5
Internal Problems
• Management factor
- Inadequate depth
- Limited experience
- One-person rule
- Inbred bureaucracy
• Weak finance function
- Lack of operating controls
• Nonparticipative board
Not all relationships last forever, even with the companies we start up ourselves. MBA tools can and should help
the venture relationship to be more robust and last longer.
But not always. Certainly not when other, stronger egos
are in conflict. In the end, the analytical approach to entrepreneurship can help the evolving small business immeasurably, as long as it isn’t preempted by the darker psychological underbelly of the entrepreneur.

Mystery #5—Dancing with the Big Guys

Should emerging companies stay clear of large entrenched companies or try to work with them?
Tales of Odd Couples. Even the most optimistic dealmaker acknowledges that the notion of a small venture
approaching a megacompany for a discussion or potential
strategic alliance is truly incongruous. The two entrepreneurs might typically sit in the oversized conference room
that comfortably seats 250, waiting for a battalion of 25 to 30
MBAs, PhDs, CPAs, and BMOCs to troop in. Their corporate staff of 2,700 oversees their 310,000 employees. “What
do you guys want to do?” they ask. They view this interruption as an “aggravation meeting” that must be dealt with
politely, but quickly. In contrast, the entrepreneurs aggressively approach the “big opportunity” like a flea climbing
the elephant’s leg with intent to rape. The circus act begins.
Occasionally, an alliance agreement with a Big Guy is
actually secured. For example:
• Our waste tire recycling company allied with a $1 billion liquid nitrogen vendor (vendor and equity agreements). Also, the company allied with a $3 billion
waste management company (which led to the $6 million acquisition of their tire-related assets).
• Our medical laser company allied with Massachusetts
General Hospital and funded (and received licensing
rights to) contract research for world-class medical
technology.
• London investors actually loved that our color-matching company had a seven-year office lease with a large
international can company; they liked the long-term
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security (and the presumed third-party endorsement
from a well-known company). We, of course, disliked
the lease’s long-term financial commitment.
• Our online investment bank/brokerage operation
allied with a $500 billion European bank. The snaillike Europeans picked our brains for a year, then
invested more than $60 million in equity. They promised to deliver one million “accredited investor”
accounts to our electronic platform over 12 months.
Their bureaucratic in-fighting over project control
delayed all milestone achievements and resulted in
their ultimate acquisition of our assets. The Big Bank
killed us with slow love.
Guiding Principles for Strategic Alliances. What does
practice suggest about theory in this partnering mystery?
Kuhn (1988) discusses negotiating skills and secrets that
can be applied to the strategic alliance deal-making
process. Relevant tests include
• Consistency Test: Do major variables hang
together (goals, cash flow, milestones)?
• Importance Test: Relevance, benefits?
• Structure Test: Are we biting the right bait?
• Smell Test: Is negotiation obstinate, disruptive, honest?
Many negotiating games are played: Big firms train their
representatives to low ball, high ball, bluff, bait-‘n’-switch,
sandbag, sting (lie, drop out), and refer to “unknown,
uncontrollable authorities.” Perhaps during these stressful,
direction-turning times, we need to recall the psychoanalytical teachings of Zaleznik (circa 1965), Levinson (1970)
and Kets de Vries (1985). I’d be crazy not to.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize my views on important conditions to ensure success and well-structured alliances.
The a priori conditions for success must be built into the
deal structure.
Strategic alliances can represent wonderful access to
markets, technology, and resources. Investors absolutely
adore the implied third-party endorsement of “an important player.” If one can get through the mating dance, due

Table 6
Joint Ventures:
Important Conditions to Ensure Success
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Style of operations
Time perspectives
Financial goals
Collaborative decision-making
Balanced strengths
Past work relationship
No takeover threats
Top echelon visibility and access

Table 7
Well-structured Alliances
1.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Strategic synergy
Positioning opportunity
Limited resource availability
Less risk
Cooperative spirit
Clarity of purpose
WIN-WIN
Positive third-party endorsement for investors

diligence (ideally, give them your IPO registration material!), and big company smugness (throw your MBA back at
them!), then all that is left is the 98 percent effort to execute
the alliance. The land mines start appearing.
What can go wrong dealing with the Big Guys? “I
thought my partner was responsible for that?” is a typical
lament of a failing strategic alliance!

Mystery #6—Control v. Funding

Should entrepreneurs focus on personal equity control of their
company or relinquish control in exchange for adequate
resources?
This is the easiest mystery to figure out. Cash is king.
Initially, most entrepreneurs answer incorrectly.
Reality Check for Control.
• In practice, entrepreneurs psychologically view the
venture as a “child.” Often they’re ignoring their
own family life, so the notion of being loyal to the
venture offspring has supreme import. Giving away
control of the child is often deemed to be total anathema to them. The reaction is remarkably visceral.
• In theory, the entrepreneur needs adequate funds to
fuel company growth. Accepting funding dilutes the
entrepreneur’s percentage ownership. The more
funds raised at initially low company valuation, the
more severe the dilution impact.
• The balancing act is a tradeoff. One “optimizes” the
coupling of resources with venture need; it is not a
“maximization” effort. Too much capital raise-up too
early causes unnecessary dilution at low valuations.
• The bottom line: Careful financial planning can be
effective. Many venture team members with 1 to 5
percent ownership stakes at IPO time can become
financially well-off. A sliver of a big juicy pie can be a
lot. Conversely, 100 percent of very little is very little.
Complexities of Equity Ownership. An analysis of the
resource-equity control mystery is a nontrivial exercise in
the trade-off of many variables. Several key variables
influence the assessment:
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• Cash needs/timing
Sales growth and working capital requirements
Profit margins
Investment requirements
Working capital line of credit availability
• Perceived valuation by sophisticated investors (prev. post- money) at important milestones
• Source of funds; different investors have selective
ROI criteria
• Impact (fully dilutive) of employee stock options (at
particular exercise prices).
Ronstadt (1988) devotes an entire text to entrepreneurial finance, wherein he articulates the end game as being
neither under- nor overcapitalized in fund-raising at any
point in time. The trick is to find a threshold band of capitalization at critical points in the venture’s growth cycle to
determine funding requirements. He emphasizes, rationally, comprehensive, exhaustive interaction of spreadsheet
values, conditioned by severe questioning of key assumptions, and heeding key industry ratio values. He advocates
worst, likely, and best case scenario analysis.
Hoffman and Blaky (1987) explain how to negotiate
terms with investors:
• Understand weighted v. full-ratcheted antidilution
provisions.
• Offset equity forfeiture for poor performance with
bonus options for good performance.
• Define employment control—severance values.
• Address shareholder control—voting-rights issues.
• Assure an ability to cash-out personally.
Simplifying Model of Dilution and Ownership. Years of
heated discussions with emotional entrepreneurs have
forced me to devise a simple, generic, integrated model to
accommodate the iterative aspects of this otherwise overly-complicated equity-bleed process.
Table 8 shows, with illustrative values, how the CEOentrepreneur can be diluted down to 27 percent ownership
and still make him or her worth (on paper until he or she
cashes out) more than $16 million. Hand-holding for the
entrepreneur, the venture team, and the investors is still
required. This interactive model helps with all these stakeholders.

Mystery #7—Funding: Logic or Miracle?

Is the ultimate raise-up of seed and growth capital a logical fallout of the entrepreneurship process, or a serendipitous miracle?
Views on Money.
“Go where the money is.”
—Willie Sutton (Brink’s Bank robber)
“Money is the resource to gain market share.”
—Japanese saying

“Money is not the goal; just the best measure of success.”
—Entrepreneurial saying
“Money is the goal; just ask the stockholders!”
—Investor saying
Financing Process. Siegel (1990) presents a synopsis
(see Table 9) that summarizes the financing process.
Timmons and Sander (1986) remind us of everything
the entrepreneur doesn’t want to know about raising capital; the process can take up to half the founder’s time over
the first six to nine months. He may have to guarantee
loans personally. The entrepreneur can get fired. His stock
can be appropriated. Control of the BOD can be wrested
from him. He can lose his “child!”
Resolution to Capital Raise-up.
• Persistence in selling the venture to investors is key.
The entrepreneur must work the capital raise-up 18
hours a day. Case example: Use reverse psychology.
In the tire recycling venture, most of the seed and
bridge capital came from people whom I initially
insisted couldn’t be in the deal. The more I resisted,
the more they wanted “in.” At IPO time, we submitted in sequence seven different registration statements to the SEC, with four different underwriters.
Desperate, driven people simply don’t give up. They
push until there is no more “push” left! We wore
everyone out. The professional support people
(lawyers, auditors, etc.) needed the deal to close so
they could get paid!
• Demonstrate the magic of the cap chart (Table 8) to
investors. They are looking for a 4-bagger or an 8bagger on their money. The brilliance is to show
these investors how they get their “vig” while keeping the deal terms favorable to the venture.
• The harder you work, the luckier you get.
Excruciating detail to investor follow-up, investor
group meetings with management, weekly updates,
daily calls—all create investor interest.
• In truth, this money-raising mystery is still pretty
much a mystery to me. Work the logical financing
process and gleefully accept good luck when it presents itself. The Law of Large Numbers generally is at
work. The more financial raise-up action that is in
play, the higher the probability of success. The higher the probability that you will get lucky!
Conclusions to a Magical Mystery Tour
• Entrepreneurship is not for most (read: 99.9%) people.
• Erratic income; minimum fringe benefits
• Highly cycling net worth
• Excessive work tension, pressure, impact on family life
• Long gaps before enjoying positive feedback
• 2 percent inspiration, 98 percent perspiration
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• Benefits are worth it to the truly addicted.
• For me, measures of success have outweighed the costs:
- personal financial gain
- helped create more than 5,000 jobs
- helped to create about 7 dozen
millionaires—2 dozen (first time);
5 dozen (already there)

-

helped create several dozen companies
with products serving thousands of
satisfied customers
• Issues of entrepreneurial theory v. practice; intuition
v. analysis; risk v. reward; individual drive v. team
building efforts—all can be reconciled. But only if you
work so very hard enough to get lucky.

Table 8
Simple Equity Model
[Co. Valuations in $000's]

Accounting for Stock Options
Dilution

Without Stock Options Dilution

Scenario / Stage
Pre-Money Value
Additional Investment
Pre-Money Stock Price
New Investment Stock Price
Post-Money Blended Stock Price

Initial

Angel #1

Employee
Options
Plan #1

$3,500
n/a

$6,500
$1,500

$8,000
n/a

$12,000
$3,500

$15,500
n/a

$45,000
$15,000

$3.50
n/a
$3.50

$6.50
$6.50
$6.50

$6.50
n/a
$6.50

$9.75
$9.75
$9.75

$9.75
n/a
$9.75

$28.31
$28.31
$28.31

Pre-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Additional No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Post-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Post-Money Value

1,000,000
0
1,000,000
$3,500

1,000,000
230,769
1,230,769
$8,000

1,230,769
0
1,230,769
$8,000

Issue of Employee Stock Options
[ as % of I/O ]

Employee
Options
Plan #2

IPO
@ $ Valuation

1,230,769
358,974
1,589,744
$15,500

1,589,744
0
1,589,744
$15,500

10%

No. of Stock Options Issued

$60,000

158,974

$5.20

Fully Diluted No. of Shares
Fully Diluted Post-Money Value
Fully Diluted Blended Stock Price

1,589,744
529,915
2,119,658

10%

123,077

Exercise Price [ @
80%
of Pre-money Stock price ]

Fully Diluted Holdings:

VC or Pvt.
Placement # 1

$7.80

1,230,769
$8,000
$6.50

1,353,846
$8,640
$6.38

1,712,821
$16,140
$9.42

1,871,795
$17,380
$9.29

2,401,709
$61,880
$25.76

%'s, Nos. of Shares, & Values

CEO

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

65.0%
650,000
$2,275

52.8%
650,000
$4,225

48.0%
650,000
$4,148

37.9%
650,000
$6,125

34.7%
650,000
$6,035

27.1%
650,000
$16,747

SVP

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

35.0%
350,000
$1,225

28.4%
350,000
$2,275

25.9%
350,000
$2,234

20.4%
350,000
$3,298

18.7%
350,000
$3,250

14.6%
350,000
$9,018

Angel #1

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

18.8%
230,769
$1,500

17.0%
230,769
$1,473

13.5%
230,769
$2,175

12.3%
230,769
$2,143

9.6%
230,769
$5,946

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

0

21.0%
358,974
$3,383

19.2%
358,974
$3,333

14.9%
358,974
$9,249

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

9.1%
123,077
$785

7.2%
123,077
$1,160

15.1%
282,051
$2,619

11.7%
282,051
$7,267

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

VC / PP #1

Total Employees

Public Investors

0
$0

0.0%
0

$0

0.0%
0

$0

$0

0.0%
0

$0

0
$0

0

0.0%
0

0

0

0

22.1%
529,915
$13,653

100.0%
1,000,000
$3,500

100.0%
1,230,769
$8,000

100.0%
1,353,846
$8,640

100.0%
1,712,821
$16,140

100.0%
1,871,795
$17,380

100.0%
2,401,709
$61,880

$0

All Investors &
Employees

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

Note:

Inputs are highlighted, like this.

0.0%

$0

0.0%

$0

0.0%

$0

$0
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Table 9
Financing Process
A. Preparing for a Financing Transaction
1. Identify your goals and financing requirements
3. Management team
2. Business plan
4. Professional advisors
B. Sources of Financing
1. Start with sources of capital known to the company
2. Seed capital
3. Venture capital
4. Institutional investors
5. Government sponsored/subsidized financing
6. Strategic or corporate partners
C. Risk V. Reward
1. Debt
4. Personal guaranties
2. Equity
5. Technology rights
3. Pledge of corporate assets/stock
6. Management and control
D. Financing Process
1. Timetable
4. Disclosure/offering documents
2. Due diligence
5. Director and stockholder approval
3. Clean-up of corporate records
and insider transactions
E. Securities Laws
1. Federal laws
- Registration of securities
- Exemptions from registration
- “Safe harbors” - Regulation D
- Accredited investors
2. State (“Blue Sky”) laws - Registration of securities
- Exemptions from registration
- Limited offering exemptions
3. Use of sales and advertising literature
4. Brokers, dealers, and finders
F. Equity Financing Terms and Conditions
1. Investment agreements
5. Registration rights
2. Representation and warranties
6. Antidilution rights
3. Restrictions on transfer
7. Conversion rights
4. Preemptive rights
8. Puts, calls, and mandatory redemptions
G. Tax Considerations
1. Subchapter S
2. Section 1244 stock
3. Stock for services - Section 83(b)
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